Sealed Computation: Abstract Requirements for Mechanisms to Support
  Trustworthy Cloud Computing by Abdullah, Lamya et al.
Sealed Computation:
Abstract Requirements for Mechanisms to
Support Trustworthy Cloud Computing
Lamya Abdullah1,2, Felix Freiling1, Juan Quintero1,2, and Zinaida Benenson1
1 Friedrich-Alexander-Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg (FAU), Erlangen, Germany
felix.freiling@cs.fau.de, zinaida.benenson@fau.de.
2 Uniscon GmbH, Munich, Germany
lamya.abdullah@uniscon.de, juan.quintero@uniscon.de.
Abstract. In cloud computing, data processing is delegated to a remote
party for efficiency and flexibility reasons. A practical user requirement
usually is that the confidentiality and integrity of data processing needs
to be protected. In the common scenarios of cloud computing today, this
can only be achieved by assuming that the remote party does not in any
form act maliciously. In this paper, we propose an approach that avoids
having to trust a single entity. Our approach is based on two concepts:
(1) the technical abstraction of sealed computation, i.e., a technical mech-
anism to confine the processing of data within a tamper-proof hardware
container, and (2) the additional role of an auditing party that itself
cannot add functionality to the system but is able to check whether the
system (including the mechanism for sealed computation) works as ex-
pected. We discuss the abstract technical and procedural requirements
of these concepts and explain how they can be applied in practice.
Keywords: security requirements, trusted computing, trustworthy computing,
cloud computing, cloud service, auditor
1 Introduction
Cloud computing has become widespread as it allows for supplying and uti-
lizing computation resources in an on-demand fashion. This reduces cost, in-
creases flexibility and improves infrastructure scalability [19]. Cloud computing
is increasingly being adapted for services provided by networks of small devices,
commonly referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT Cloud [2] or “Cloud of
Things” (CoT) [1] provides resources such as storage, analytics tools and shared
configurable computing resources to reduce the cost and complexity associated
with the IoT systems.
When the data processing and storage are delegated to a cloud provider,
users of cloud services usually have to trust the cloud provider to act as expected.
However, in common cloud deployments, there is no technical guarantee that a
single malicious insider like a system administrator or a person with physical
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
07
84
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 J
un
 20
19
2 Lamya Abdullah, Felix Freiling, Juan Quintero, and Zinaida Benenson
access to the cloud infrastructure does not tamper with code and data. Hence
cloud clients should be provided some technical guarantees and indications that
the cloud service is trustworthy.
As an example, consider the scenario of an IoT Cloud implementation for
usage-based insurance (UBI) [16], a novel car insurance business model, where
the insurance company calculates premiums based on drivers behavior using
actual driving data.
In UBI, participating cars are equipped with a telematics devices to collect
driving data such as location, speed, acceleration, cornering, and other details.
Driving data are processed to get a ranking based on personal driving behav-
ior. Using the driver ranking, the insurance company calculates a customized
premium to the policyholder employing a more accurate risk estimate, reducing
incurred losses [9, 25] and offering a bonus in the case of good driving behavior.
UBI promises many benefits such as, for the insurance companies, reducing
incurred losses through accurate risk estimates [25, 9] and, for the policyholders
(drivers), improving their driving style through feedback and decreasing their
premiums. But obviously, UBI also raises concerns, such as user discrimination
[16], and consumer privacy [25, 9].
Fig. 1. High-level view of usage-based insurance scenario: The data is processed by the
service provider on behalf of the insurance company. Processing is performed by a cloud
provider running the service provider’s software. The policyholders receive feedback on
their driving habits.
Figure 1 depicts an abstract view of UBI: The service provider may actually
be the same entity as the insurance company, but in many business implemen-
tations (BonusDrive by Allianz [4], SmartDriver by HUK-Coburg [15]) it is a
different company. One reason for separation is that insurance companies do not
have the corresponding know-how to compute the driving ranking. Another rea-
son is that the insurance companies want to mitigate consumers privacy concerns
by stating that they have no access to the behavioral data, as it is processed by
a third party [5].
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Users who process sensitive data in the cloud have the following general
security requirements:
– Confidentiality of data: Policyholders agree that their ranking is computed,
but they want their individual usage data to remain confidential towards the
insurance company and the cloud provider.
– Confidentiality of code: Service providers want to protect their intellectual
property from other parties, in particular the insurance company and the
cloud provider. So the software which is deployed in the cloud should be
protected.
– Integrity of data and code: Insurance company, service provider and the pol-
icyholders should have a guarantee that the cloud provider does not change
data or code in any unauthorized way.
On the one hand, users establish a sense of trust in the cloud provider in
practice via contracts over Service Level Agreements (SLAs), auditing certificates
and reputation.
Unfortunately, even with the most refined SLAs the necessity to place trust
in the cloud provider remains.
On the other hand, numerous technical approaches [18] have been proposed
to achieve security requirements such as those above using trusted hardware.
For example, hardware security modules (HSMs) [10, 26], i.e., tamper-resistant
physical computing devices, can perform secure and confidential computation
of data. Using HSMs, it is possible to deploy specific software modules, create
cryptographic keys and process data purely within the hardware device. Return-
ing to our UBI scenario, the HSM can be used to effectively protect the service
provider’s data and code from the cloud provider. However, in this case the ne-
cessity to trust a single entity is not avoided, it is merely shifted from the cloud
provider to the trusted hardware provider. This observation is not specific to
HSMs but holds also for other such technologies such as Intel SGX [6, 24].
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we propose a general approach that ensures generic confidentiality
and integrity of cloud service and that avoids the necessity of having to trust a
single entity.
Our approach is based on the combination of two concepts:
1. Sealed computation, an abstract technical mechanism to confine the process-
ing of data within a tamper-proof hardware container (like a HSM), and
2. a procedural mechanism of mutual checking applying the additional role of
an auditing party, which is necessary to check whether the system works as
expected, but cannot modify it.
We describe the abstract technical and procedural requirements of both concepts
and argue that they are sufficient to achieve the generic security properties de-
scribed above. In the spirit of work by Morris Jr. [20], our work is conceptional,
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avoiding over-formalization but still providing clear definitions and evaluating
statements. The main insight is to show how an abstract hardware mechanism
(sealed computation, solely defined by its requirements) must be utilized in the
cloud service such that the necessity to trust in a single entity is avoided.
Similar to other work [24, 6], this paper focuses on integrity and confidential-
ity properties and do not consider availability. We use the UBI scenario above
repeatedly as an example to illustrate our exposition, it generalizes to many
other scenarios.
1.2 Outlook
We first define the concept of sealed computation in Section 2. Then the system
and attacker model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the procedural
mechanism applying the role of an auditor.
In Section 5 we provide a security analysis and argue that general security
requirements are satisfied unless two parties act maliciously. Related work is
discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Sealed Computation
While data at rest can, typically, be protected by encryption, while protecting
data during processing commonly is still an interesting problem to solve. We in-
troduce a definition of sealed computation using abstract roles to keep it general,
later, these are mapped to the parties introduced in Section 3. The term sealed
computation is an abstraction that describes a well-defined level of protection
against such attackers. Intuitively, this is done by encapsulating the software
execution within a physical piece of hardware. We utilize the notion of sealed
computation to maintain the integrity and confidentiality requirements of the
system.
2.1 Definition
In sealed computation, a party A provides a physical execution container C
into which a party B may “seal” its software. The container C ensures that the
software is running in an unmodified fashion. Furthermore, C also guarantees
that only a restricted set of interactions with the software are possible through
a well-defined interface. Apart from that, no information is leaked from within
C to the outside, not even to A the provider of the container nor the software
provider B.
More formally, let a party A provide a physical execution container C and
party B provide a softwareM which implements some input/output specification
via a well-defined interface. The interface can be thought of as a description of
input/output signals over wires or the format of incoming or outgoing protocol
messages.
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Definition 1 (Sealed Computation). We say that B seals M within C pro-
vided by A if the following technical requirements are met:
– (Sealing) A and B cannot access the code and data of M after it has been
sealed within C, apart from changes allowed by the interface.
– (Attestation) As long as M has not terminated and as long as A acts hon-
estly, C can provide evidence which proves that C is running software pro-
vided by B in a manner which is unique to the sealing instance, i.e., any
change of M , C or any subsequent sealing using the same combination will
result in different evidence.
– (Black-box) Information flow between M and any other party (including A
and B) is restricted by the interface specification of M , i.e., nothing about
the internal state of M (code and data) can be learned apart from what is
given away via the interface.
– (Tamper-resistance) Any usage of M that does not satisfy the interface spec-
ification results in termination of M and the destruction of C such that
neither code nor data from within C can be retrieved.
Intuitively, the Sealing requirement of sealed computation binds the execu-
tion of a program to a particular hardware environment. The requirements of
Black-box and Tamper-resistance limit access to data and code only to interac-
tions given in the functional specification of M : Black-box restricts information
flow for expected interactions, while Tamper-resistance does this for unexpected
interactions.
The Attestation requirement enables external parties to validate the fact that
M has been sealed. It implies that C contains some known unique characteristic
that can be validated by checking the provided evidence. This validation, how-
ever, depends on the correctness of A. A common realization of this is for A to
embed a secret key within C and allow external parties to validate its existence
by providing the corresponding public key. The existence of such a unique char-
acteristic implies that it is possible to establish an authentic and confidential
communication channel to M once sealing has started.
Similarly, note that B or any user of M still has to rely on A to act honestly
because it is not verifiable whether C actually implements sealed computation.
However, if B correctly seals M within C provided by an honest A, even A can-
not change M afterwards and the tamper-resistance requirement of C protects
all secrets within M that are not accessible via its interface or before sealing.
2.2 Confidential Software Deployment
The notion of sealed computation is a powerful abstraction that can be used
to describe techniques that protect software also during deployment. We now
argue that the technical requirements of sealed computation allow to ensure the
confidentiality of the code which is sealed.
Intuitively, the idea of confidential software deployment is for B to initially
install within the sealed computation a loader stub which is able to load the
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final user program specified by B into C. Within the sealed computation, this
software is decrypted, installed and then takes over the final interface operations
expected by the users. This loader stub can be part of the sealed computation
mechanism from the start. Since it can be easily added to any mechanism that
satisfies Definition 1, we did not include it as an additional requirement in that
definition.
Observe that M cannot be assumed to remain confidential if A is untrust-
worthy. However, if A is trustworthy, sealed computation can be used to run
code that remains confidential even towards A.
3 System and Attacker Model
3.1 Participants
For a general cloud-based application system model, our approach assumes the
following main participants - referred to as entities or parties interchangeably:
1. Data Prosumer (DP): The DP is a producer and/or consumer of data at the
same time, i.e., it produces input data and/or has an interest to consume
the computed results. The way in which data is processed by the application
is described by the DP in the form of a functional specification.
2. Application Software Provider (ASP): The ASP develops and maintains the
analytics software which processes the data in the cloud and computes de-
sired results according to the functional specification.
3. Cloud Provider (CP): The CP provides the cloud service which includes
the hardware infrastructure, the software, and all associated configuration,
administration and deployment tasks. The CP is also responsible for the
security of the system as well as its availability towards the DP.
4. Auditing Party (AP): The AP is an independent party that helps to en-
sure the integrity of the hardware and software before the system becomes
operational. We simply refer to the AP as the auditor.
5. Sealed Computation Provider (SCP): Additional entity to be considered is
the SCP provides the sealed computation technology.
To map the sealed computation definition in Section 2 to the UBI scenario, it
may help to think of the execution container C being a specific HSM provided
by party A (the SCP), while party B is the service provider (SP) who wrote
software M on behalf of insurance company (DP).
3.2 User Security Requirements
The desired security requirements of the parties are described in more detail here.
Every requirement has a name that is prefixed by the corresponding participant
role.
Definition 2 (User Security Requirements). The participants have the fol-
lowing security requirements:
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– (DP-Privacy) The DP requires that data remains confidential to any other
party, i.e., neither CP, nor ASP, nor AP, nor SCP can learn anything about
the data.3
– (DP-Integrity) Results which are obtained from the system by the DP are cor-
rectly computed on data as provided according to the functional specification.
DP-Integrity covers data storage and processing integrity.
– (ASP-Integrity) The analytics software provided by the ASP is executed in an
unmodified form within the system. Note that ASP-Integrity does not imply
DP-Integrity since the latter refers also to data.
– (ASP-Confidentiality) No other party except the AP is able to learn about
the analytics software developed by the ASP apart from what is described in
the functional specification.
3.3 Attacker Model
In this section, we formulate the attacker model. First, the ways in which indi-
vidual participants may maliciously misbehave are described (the local attacker
assumption). Then we define a condition that restricts the number of parties that
may act maliciously (the global attacker assumption). The participants may act
as follows:
– Application Software Provider (ASP): The ASP could provide an analytics
software that leaks information about the processed data, thus violating DP-
Privacy. Also, the ASP could violate DP-Integrity by providing software that
incorrectly computes the results, i.e., computes the results not according to
the functional specification provided by the DP.
– Sealed Computation Provider (SCP): The SCP could provide an incorrect
sealed computation mechanism, i.e., a mechanism that has back-doors or vul-
nerabilities that enable changing code and data, thus violating ASP-Integrity
or DP-Integrity, or a system that leaks code or data which violates ASP-
Confidentiality or DP-Privacy.
– Cloud Provider (CP): The CP could leak any software that it has access to a
malicious party, thereby violating ASP-Confidentiality. The CP has physical
access to the mechanism provided by the SCP so it may attempt to access
and/or modify data that is stored/processed, thus violating ASP-Integrity,
DP-Integrity or DP-Privacy.
We assume, however, that the CP protects its systems from interference and
misuse by external attackers that are not specific to our scenario. Therefore
these attacks are excluded from consideration in this work.
– Auditing Party (AP): During checking, the AP could try to add functional-
ity to the system to leak information about the processed data and/or the
software, thereby violating DP-Privacy or ASP-Confidentiality directly.
3 While privacy has many definitions, here we explicitly use the term Privacy and not
Confidentiality to emphasize end users’ privacy (as individuals) against the providers
and operators of the system (as organizations).
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If any party acts in ways described above we say that this party acts mali-
ciously. A party that does not act maliciously is considered honest.
For reasons of simplicity, the DP is excluded from our attacker model. Typical
misbehavior of the DP can be giving a wrong functional specification, providing
false data or to reveal the received results to any other party. Correct behavior in
this respect cannot be enforced using a trustworthy cloud service as we envision
here. Therefore, the DP is assumed to always be honest.
The global attacker assumption, i.e., a restriction on the number of parties
that may act maliciously is formulated as follows: either the AP or both SCP and
ASP are honest. More precisely, if the identifiers are taken as Boolean predicates
of whether they are acting honestly or not, then the global attacker assumption
is satisfied if the following condition holds:
AP ∨ (SCP ∧ASP )
Note that the condition is independent of the actions of the CP, and that it does
not state which party exactly acts maliciously (AP, SCP or ASP).
3.4 Availability of Remote Attestation
To establish trust, it is often necessary to use mechanisms for remote attesta-
tion. Following the terminology of Cocker et al. [8], attestation is the activity
of making a claim to an appraiser about the properties of a target by supplying
evidence which supports that claim. An attester is a party performing this activ-
ity. The result of an attestation depends on a mixture of facts that the appraiser
can check directly on the evidence provided by the attester (e.g., cryptographic
signatures) and trust in the attester itself (the mechanism by which the evidence
was generated). Any party being part of a remote attestation has the require-
ment that the directly checkable part of the attestation works as expected. In
practice, this means that the used cryptography (e.g., digital signatures) is secure
and that honest parties protect their cryptographic secrets.
4 Combining Sealed Computation with an Auditor
One application of sealed computation in cloud computing would be for the
CP to offer a mechanism to its “customers” DP and ASP to perform a sealed
computation on the provided cloud hardware. In this case SCP and CP would
be the same party. However, note that utilizing sealed computation alone is not
sufficient to ensure the participants’ security requirements because (1) sealed
computation does not guarantee anything before sealing takes place, and (2) the
mechanism of sealed computation cannot be trusted without means to verify its
function. We will therefore treat CP and SCP as independent parties.
4.1 The Role of Auditor
The sealed computation is combined with the role of an auditing party AP to
establish the security requirements described in Definition 2. In general, auditors
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are known to usually perform independent checks and assess other entities in
terms of service, performance, security and data privacy and system operations
[14]. We use the AP to both guarantee the functionality of the sealing mechanism
provided by the SCP and to verify the functionality of the analytic software
provided by the ASP. Once sealing has taken place, the mechanism of sealed
computation ensures continued trust in the system without having to interact
with the AP anymore.
The auditor is not allowed to add or modify functionality in the system. This
is ensured by a mutual checking procedure described below. The AP, however,
has to enable a possibility of attestation which is independent of the SCP. This
can be realized by either providing an independent mechanism or (better) by
adequately configuring an attestation technique that is already presented in the
sealed computation technology (e.g., by embedding a secret within the physical
container of sealed computing).
Figure 2 illustrates the structural model with the roles and responsibilities
of each participant. The idea is to base the well-functioning of the system on
the assumption that either the auditor or all parties checked by the auditor are
honest during critical phases of system operation. While commonly the DP had
to trust the CP exclusively, it now must rely on trust either in the SCP and ASP
or the AP (a condition expressed in our global attacker assumption above).
Fig. 2. Refined structural model with participants: The ASP provides software run
within a sealed computation, a mechanism provided by the SCP and hosted by the
CP. The AP performs an independent verification of the analytic software and the
sealed computation container and enables mechanisms for the DP to remotely check
its integrity.
To illustrate the different roles using our introductory UBI scenario, the
policyholders and the insurance company share the role of the DP. The insur-
ance company defines the functional specification of the driver ranking based on
which the ASP develops the analytic software. The SCP could be a provider of
the sealed computation container (like a HSM) and the AP would be a company
like a certified public accountant, that is able to perform code and security audits
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on hard- and software. The SCP is assumed to have appropriate security mecha-
nisms in place against attacks by parties not considered above (e.g., hackers and
cybercriminals). Regarding remote attestation, the HSM provides certificates
with which attestation evidence generated by the HSM can be verified [27].
4.2 Trust Establishment Procedure
For simplicity and comprehension of discussion we distinguish the execution life-
time of the system model into mutually exclusive phases: the Checking phase
and Running phase. During the Checking phase, the trust establishment pro-
cedure takes place, while the Running phase begins with the service start-up.
During the Running phase, the DP can upload data and get results and the CP
operates the cloud system.
The exact actions and obligations of the participants and interplay among
each other are described as trust establishment procedure below. This proce-
dure can be regarded as a form of procedural requirement which in combination
with the technical requirements of Sealed Computation allows to fulfill the user
requirements.
Definition 3 (Trust Establishment Procedure with Mutual Checking).
The participants undergo the following procedure:
1. Trust establishment in analytics software:
(a) The ASP prepares the analytics software ready to be deployed.
(b) The AP verifies whether the analytics software satisfies the functional
specification and does not leak any information about the processed data.
(c) At the same time, the ASP ensures that the AP does not change any
functionality of the analytics software.
(d) As a result of this procedure, ASP and AP generate public evidence to
be produced by an attestation mechanism by which it can be verified that
the checked version of the software is running in the sealed computation
(e.g., a hash of the binary code that can be attested).
2. Trust establishment in sealed computation mechanism:
(a) Before the sealed computation system is shipped and deployed, regardless
of the deployment model, the SCP prepares the sealed computation mech-
anism (hardware and software, including the possibility for confidential
software deployment).
(b) The AP verifies (off-line) the integrity of the sealed computation mech-
anism, i.e., the entire hardware and software system. This includes a
physical check for the security measures, policy compliance, data secu-
rity and data privacy, functional check also of the confidential software
deployment mechanism.
(c) At the same time, the SCP ensures that the AP is not adding new func-
tionality during these checks, i.e., that the AP is behaving according to
the auditing procedure specifications.
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(d) The AP and the SCP generate public evidence that enables attestation of
the sealed computation mechanism, e.g., by embedding independent pri-
vate keys within the sealed computation container to which they possess
the corresponding public keys.
3. The sealing mechanism is started in the presence of AP and SCP. At this
time the auditing procedure ends and both SCP and AP can leave the deploy-
ment site which is run by the CP.
4. Using the confidential deployment procedure, the ASP loads the code that was
checked by the AP in Step 1 above.
5. The AP and the SCP must be present any time when the system and/or the
sealed computation mechanism is reset/restarted, is under maintenance or
shall be changed. In such cases the AP and the SCP must re-check the system
and both must re-enable the attestation mechanism as described in the above
procedure.
The result of this procedure are two pieces of public evidence that all parties
can use to verify their security requirements:
– Public evidence provided by AP and SCP that DP, CP and ASP can use to
verify that an instance of sealed computation is running.
– Public evidence provided by AP and ASP that can be used to verify that a
particular software is running within the sealed computation.
5 Security Analysis and Discussion
5.1 Security Analysis
To argue that the security requirements from Def. 2 are met, we make the fol-
lowing introductory observation: The sealed computation mechanism defined in
Def. 1 will not be in the Running phase if the ASP software or the sealed com-
putation mechanism is not correct.
To see this, we make a case distinction based on the global attacker assump-
tion which states that all parties can act maliciously as long as the global attacker
assumption is satisfied, i.e., either the AP or both the ASP and the SCP behave
honestly. There are three possible cases for parties to act maliciously during
the checking phase when the trust establishment procedure (Definition 3) takes
place:
– The ASP is malicious: If the ASP is malicious, then the AP must be honest.
So if the ASP acts maliciously and implements an incorrect software then
the checking procedure (Step 1.b) mandates that the AP checks the soft-
ware correctness. Since the AP is honest, it will detect the incorrectness of
software, the check will fail and the Running phase will not take place.
– The SCP is malicious: If the SCP is malicious, then the AP must be honest.
So if the SCP is not honest, the sealing container may not be implemented
correctly. However, the checking procedure (Step 2.b) requires the AP to
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check whether the sealed computation requirements are met. Since the AP
is honest, it will detect incorrectness and the Running phase will not be
entered.
– The AP is malicious: If the AP is malicious, then the ASP and the SCP are
both honest. In this case, the analytics software and the sealed computation
mechanism are correct from the beginning. Furthermore, the mutual checking
procedure (Steps 1.c and 2.c) requires that both ASP and SCP ensure that
the AP does not manipulate the functionality of the analytics software or
the sealed computation mechanism. So if the Running phase is entered, the
sealed computation mechanism and the analytics software are both correct.
Therefore, under the attacker assumption, the establishment procedure guar-
antees that the system will not enter the Running phase unless it is working
properly as defined in the specification.
Subsequently, during the Running phase, the sealed computation mechanism
(Definition. 1) takes over to guarantee the desired requirements. To argue for the
fulfillment of ASP-Integrity and DP-Integrity, the Sealing and Tamper-resistance
requirements of the sealed computation ensure that content (data and code) in
the sealed container cannot be improperly modified. Furthermore, the Black-
box requirement restricts information flow such that DP-Privacy and (assuming
confidential deployment) ASP-Confidentiality are maintained.
5.2 Discussion
While our results are conceptual, they provide a preliminary guideline of build-
ing a trustworthy cloud computing service in which cloud customers can trust
that cloud providers and operators cannot access their data and code. In essence,
sealed computation may not be a brand new concept, as sealed storage was de-
fined by Morris [20]. Whereas, to the best of our knowledge, sealed computation
was not formally defined comprehensively before. Any computational implemen-
tation that satisfies the requirements defined in Definition 1 can be considered
a sealed computation mechanism. However, in practice, one may argue that any
assumption like the security of cryptography or requirements like Black-box of
any hardware device only hold with a certain probability, so the guarantees in
practice never hold with 100%. One may also argue that many parts of the
procedures described in Definition 3 are also rather hypothetical and cannot be
realized fully in practice. For example, the AP is assumed to perfectly verify the
correctness of the software of the ASP (in Step 1b) against the functional speci-
fication. While software verification has come a long way, it still is restricted by
the size and complexity of the software system. Another example that appears
far from practice is the statement that the AP can verify the correctness of the
sealed computation container (hardware and software) provided by the SCP (in
Step 2b). It is well-known that the production of hardware is a very complex
process involving lots of different technologies. The resulting chips are rather
non-transparent and need complex validation equipment to be checked.
Useful insights can be inferred from the proposed approach. While the AP
is one party in our model, in practice it can consist of multiple independent
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auditing actors, e.g., different companies that all check independent parts of the
system and mutually certify the results towards each other. The collection of
auditors in its entirety then forms the AP, meaning also that all “sub-auditors”
must behave correctly for the AP to be regarded as honest. In practice, these
sub-auditors are even often part of the same company, albeit in different parts
that are independent of each others (like software development and testing de-
partments).
Another highlight is, it is possible to delegate security enforcement to trusted
hardware without having to trust a single entity. However, during the Check-
ing phase, the AP must be continuously present until the sealed computation
container runs, and it must be possible to establish attestation evidence which
is independently supported by the AP and the SCP (for the sealed computa-
tion container) and by the AP and the ASP (for the analytics software). These
points result from the requirement of mutual checking, i.e., not only does the
AP verify the actions of ASP/SCP, but also ASP/SCP need to prevent the AP
from slipping in new functionality to software and hardware, a detail which is
often overlooked or (unconvincingly) excluded by the assumption that the AP is
always honest. Being able to embed shared attestation credentials of mutually
untrusted parties in a single trusted hardware container is a feature which is —
at least to our knowledge — not supported by any currently available trusted
computing mechanism [18].
So overall, the proposed approach presents an idealized version of system
construction and deployment processes which can serve as an orientation for
practice towards achieving a trustworthy service.
6 Related Work
Privacy is a major factor in trusting data and computation outsourcing, such as
in a cloud-based application. Hence trust establishment has been discussed in the
context of cloud from different perspectives in the literature, we distinguish them
into technical and non-technical trust enhancement approaches. Georgiopoulou
and Lambrinoudakis [13] reviewed a number of trust models for cloud computing
trying to provide a gap analysis in the literature. However, the review considered
only a very limited set of models.
Non-technical approaches have been developed and used ranging from SLAs
and recommendations for security architecture, risk management and opera-
tional teams. For example, Alhanahnah et al. [3] studied a trust evaluation
framework to allow cloud customers to choose among set of cloud providers
based on trust levels. The authors distinguished trust factors into two sets:
SLA-based and non-SLA factors based on the provider’s reputation and even
financial status.
Rizvi et al. [22] utilized the auditor role to provide an objective trust baseline
assessment to enable clients to decide between CP candidates. The proposal
delegates the trust assessment to an auditor to calculate trust values. So that
clients who need to choose between CPs request the trust values from the auditor
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based on required service. The auditor role, we present, is not the same as the
third party role in these works as shown in the trust establishment procedure 3.
Hence the common trust management model in the Web relies on the binding
a domain name and a public key, is not enough for privacy in cloud computing.
A number of solutions were presented to enforce trust via technical means that
ensure the privacy of the users data. Santos et al. [23] employed attribute-base
encryption to provide a policy enforcement protocol based on Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) abstraction. Similarly, Li et al. [17] proposed a model to support
security duty separation in multi-tenant IaaS cloud between CP and customers
based on TPM and they added the auditor role optionally. Moreover, Ge and
Ohoussou [11] proposed to build an architecture for IaaS model to give the
clients trust to deploy their VMs, that provides sealed storage and relies on
remote attestation.
These models [23, 17, 11] were designed for Platform as a Service (PaaS)
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud models that require less security
responsibilities on the CP [7] as they are shared with the customers, while SaaS
model requires more responsibilities from CP [22].
A trustworthy and privacy-preserving cloud may be addressed by the use
of cryptographic techniques such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [12].
However, it is still inefficient for most computations [24]. Similarly in verifiable
computing [21], it was designed to enable result correctness verification but has
not shown support for general purpose cloud computing yet.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced the sealed computation concept and proposed a mutual checking
procedure with an auditor role during setup time to provide an increased level of
security and trust in cloud scenarios. The sealed computation concept abstracts
from trusted hardware technologies like HSMs, the auditor is an abstraction of
policies and procedures that increase trust in a single party.
We believe that the abstract system model using the auditor as an additional
role is a good approach for medium-size and large cloud deployments instead of
running their own private cloud. While the existence of the role of auditor may be
intuitive, on the one hand, it is not clear whether the concept is really necessary,
i.e., whether any technique that distributes trust can simulate the auditor as
described above. On the other hand, practical methods for auditing could be
investigated. Furthermore, we wish to attempt more rigid formalization for the
attestation verification.
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